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MAKING CULTURE VISIBLE: COMMENTS
ON ELIZABETH MERTZ'S TEACHING
LAWYERS THE LANGUAGE OF LAW:
LEGAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
TRANSLATIONS
SUSAN F. HIRSCH*

INTRODUCTION

First, I congratulate the John Marshall Law School on the
occasion of its Centennial and thank those who have invited me to
participate in this symposium. It is a special pleasure to comment
on Elizabeth Mertz's extraordinarily interesting and important
paper.' She has produced a fine anthropological analysis of legal
education as perceived through the lens of language. By refining
her linguistic approach to a high degree of theatrical
sophistication and applying it to the largely understudied venue of
the law school classroom, Mertz demonstrates the productive and
exciting reach of legal anthropology today. Through theoretical
sophistication
and
analysis,
Mertz
identifies
the
decontextualization that plagues the law school classroom. In the
context of the Centennial celebration's emphasis on legal
education, Mertz's paper offers an excellent opportunity to reflect
on pedagogy in the legal classroom. She offers a subtle and
detailed analysis of classrooms in which the Socratic method is the
primary discursive genre. On the one hand, her analysis reveals
that the Socratic method is an even more effective tool for teaching
certain fundamental principles of American law than many critics
suspected. On the other hand, she expresses concern that the
Socratic method's success in teaching "the language of the law"
comes at the expense of students learning to engage in the ethical
and moral issues inherent in legal conflicts.
Her unique training as both a lawyer and a linguistic
anthropologist places Mertz in a unique position from which she
can both expose this pedagogical dilemma and question whether
* Associate Professor of Anthropology and Women's Studies, Wesleyan

University.
1. See generally Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law:
Legal and AnthropologicalTranslations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91 (2000).
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either the legal education system or doctrinal pedagogy can
reconcile these contradictory effects of the Socratic method. At the
same time, Mertz notes the inherent tension between law and
anthropology. She worries--quite rightly-about whether the two
perspectives can "translate" one another. Yet, rather than attempt
to reconcile these disciplines in an effort to improve pedagogy in
the law school classroom, it might be useful to draw on Mertz's
theoretical and methodological approaches in order to enable and
encourage law students to take an anthropological perspective on
their legal education.
I make these observations from the position of teaching
anthropology at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut.
Wesleyan is a small institution with a strong commitment to
undergraduate liberal arts education. In recent years, I have
given serious thought to the issues of pedagogy and curricular
reform because Wesleyan has engaged in constructing a campus
curriculum that increases multicultural offerings and addresses
cultural and economic globalization more comprehensively. 2 As an
anthropologist, I focus my curricular contributions on offering
students a toolkit of methods and theories for understanding the
complexity of the cultural contexts in which they and others live.
At the heart of Mertz's approach is a special attention to the
nuances of local context, particularly to its cultural and linguistic
entailments.
At least several times a year, I find myself, either in front of a
class or with an individual student, making what I hope will be a
convincing argument of why a cultural anthropology major is
appropriate and, indeed, excellent preparation for becoming a
lawyer. In an era when our Economics Department entices majors
away from the so-called "soft" social sciences (e.g. anthropology),
we occasionally engage in a bit of shameless marketing. However,
until Mertz's concern over the tension between the disciplines gave
me pause, I believed, rather unthinkingly, in a close fit between
anthropology and law. I believed that the study of the former was
superb preparation for a career in law. Mertz's article does not
dissuade me from my belief in the complementary relationship
between anthropology and law.
Rather, she convincingly
illuminates the deep schism between the respective worldviews of
anthropology and law. This divide encourages me to re-examine
the differences between the two courses of study and the
implications for pedagogy. Much of my discussion draws on my
experience as a teacher of anthropology who deals primarily with
the education of undergraduates. Accordingly, in the back of my

2. See generally Susan F. Hirsch, Finding Ourselves in Difference: Critical
Ethnography in the New Century (condensed), WESLEYAN: THE UNIVERSITY
ALUMNI MAGAZINE 10, 10-13, Fall 1996.
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mind are several questions. Is anthropological training good
preparation for law school?
What does an anthropological
perspective lend to our understanding of legal pedagogy? Finally,
can law students make use of anthropological perspectives?
I.

LANGUAGE IN THE LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM

Mertz's paper provides fascinating answers to the question of
what an anthropological perspective lends to the understanding of
legal pedagogy.
By subjecting law school pedagogy to the
anthropological gaze, she illuminates in fine detail what many law
professors do in their classrooms. The scope of her research
project is very ambitious.
The project's findings make it
exceedingly powerful in several ways.
First, by conducting
research in numerous classrooms, which vary significantly from
one another, Mertz positions herself to compare and contrast legal
and anthropological education.
Second, her use of linguistic
methods subtly illustrates the detail of her arguments. Mertz's
collections, transcripts, and analysis of linguistic data is
impressive, and demonstrates her painstaking effort to satisfy the
demands of methodical rigor and analytic creativity.3
Among the many insightful observations about legal pedagogy
presented in Mertz's article, several significantly contribute to
understanding legal pedagogy. Mertz shows how the Socratic
method fosters an intrinsically decontextualized approach to
morality as students learn to read, analyze, and understand the
significance of cases. Finely detailed examples of actual speech
from law school classrooms illustrate how this linguistic tactic
trains students to perform "pragmatic" readings of legal cases.4
That is, they learn to seek out the legal authorities to which a case
speaks as the primary method of orienting the law student to the
case and the surrounding conflict in which the case arose. The
linguistic interaction of a typical Socratic classroom tends to blunt,
efface, and literally ignore the moral and ethical aspects of the
conflict underlying each case. Because the legal authorities are, at
base, what lawyers must attend, this seemingly uncaring method
conveys a subtle and critical message that, in order to be
successful, a student needs to hear and internalize.
What is ultimately most distinctive and powerful about
Mertz's work is that her conclusions about the Socratic method
emerge from an analysis of the pragmatic functions of language.
Most lay people and even most linguists focus on what language

3. See, e.g., JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); SUSAN U.
PHILIPS, IDEOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES: How JUDGES PRACTICE
LAW, POLITICS, AND COURTROOM CONTROL (1998).
4. See Mertz, supra note 1, at 101.
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means-its semantic sense-to the exclusion of what language
does-its pragmatic sense.5 By examining the effects of Socratic
interaction, Mertz makes profound conclusions that begin to
account for the reasons that law professors continue this highly
criticized method. In a brilliant stroke of analysis, she asserts the
symbolic fit or resonance between the interactional form and
function of the Socratic method and the broader logic of American
law.6 Just as Mertz offers a thoroughly convincing argument for
why the Socratic method continues to be employed in classrooms
despite a range of complaints, she also identifies negative
implications of the Socratic method, which are far more disturbing
than those registered by students who simply view the experience
as rude or demeaning. She suggests that without them even
knowing it, students may slowly and subtly imbibe a particular
legal worldview-one that tends to efface the ethical.'
Initially, this example stimulated me to think about how to
inculcate my own students with a perspective, indeed a worldview,
without them realizing it! But on further reflection, I wondered
whether the spirit of education demands a more honest disclosure
to students about both what they are learning and also the means
of teaching employed.
I am also leery of a method whose
practitioners seem largely unaware of how it actually operates.
Mertz addresses these issues as well.
Mertz raises very nuanced and compelling concerns about
another potentially negative implication of the Socratic method.
By removing analysis of the underlying conflict from its
sociocultural context, the Socratic method fosters a kind of
"cultural invisibility" in which the cultural background of litigants
are important only in so far as they serve a particular legal
argument. Mertz is equivocal here. Unmooring legal treatment
from cultural context can be liberating: everyone is potentially
treated the same. Yet a serious problem arises. How could one
ever weigh the potential good of equal treatment against the
erasure of cultural difference and moral reasoning? It might be
useful on this point to offer more examples of the liberating
possibilities of abstract equality. Such a recitation may be very
basic for those working in the law. However, in the present-day
roll back of affirmative action, it is instructive (and perhaps
imperative) to re-examine how the legal notion of "treating

5. For exceptions, see SEMIOTIC MEDITATION: SOCIOCULTURAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Elizabeth Mertz & Richard J. Parmentier
eds., 1985); NATURAL HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE (Michael Silverstein and Greg
Urban, eds. 1996).
6. See Mertz, supra note 1, 93 (discussing the effects of the Socratic
method on students).
7. See id. at 112 (maintaining that indoctrinating law students into the
Socratic system tends to discourage a commitment to social justice).
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everyone the same" is implemented through an abstract notion of
equality and with what effects.
On this point it is useful to draw a comparison to how the
Constitutional Court in the new South Africa addresses the
concept of equality as that nation develops its Constitution and,
specifically, its equality doctrine. According to Albie Sachs, the
great jurist and anti-apartheid activist who is now a Justice on the
Constitutional Court, the current section on equality is "just words
words words," which the Court is struggling to interpret in ways
that "consciously repudiate the history of apartheid South Africa."'
In their usage, equality means "equality across difference." In
this fascinating moment, he and the other South African justices
combine attention to notions of abstract equality and cultural
difference as they interpret and develop South African
constitutional law. Accomplishing this without being bound by
precedent offers the South African Constitutional Court an
especially broad and instructive context in which the tension
between equality and difference may be explored.
II.

MAKING CULTURE VISIBLE IN THE CLASSROOM

Turning back to Mertz's analysis, it seems to me that law
teachers face a critically important dilemma about whether and
how they help students to engage in ethical and moral claims. I
learned from Mertz's ethnographic depiction of the law school
classroom that, in comparison to law professors, undergraduate
teachers face very different choices when teaching about morality
and ethics. For me, these differences center around the treatment
of the cultural and social contexts in the classroom. In teaching
cultural anthropology, my central goal is to encourage students to
appreciate the complexities of the cultural contexts in which real
humans live. In this way, I encourage anthropology students to
search within those contexts for explanations of human behavior.
I push my students to think clearly about their own positioning in
relation to any cultural context they study or encounter in their
personal lives.
By positioning, I mean their political
responsibilities and ethical stances in relation to a particular
context. I accomplish this by "making culture visible" in several
ways.
For example, in my legal anthropology class, we routinely
study Islamic society, through ethnography, attempting to
This undertaking always
understand it on its own terms. 0
8. Albie Sachs, Lecture at the University of Toronto Law School (October

1999).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., JOHN BOWEN, MUSLIMS THROUGH DISCOURSE: RELIGION AND
RITUAL IN GAYO SOCIETY (1993); SHAHLA HAERI, LAW OF DESIRE: TEMPORARY
MARRIAGE IN SHI'I IRAN (1989); LAWRENCE ROSEN, BARGAINING FOR REALITY:
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elucidates the complex relation between law, religion, and
morality, given the ideological inseparability of these areas in the
Islamic belief." Anthropology courses challenge students to think
about how Islamic law, arising from sacred sources, constitutes
and represents the moral, the ethical, and the true. Though many
students initially find this view of law unfamiliar, many
eventually understand the law's position in the life of Islamic
society.
Given the contrast to their own experience, this
understanding can only come when students approach the issue
with some degree of cultural relativity. To guard against students
setting up a stereotype based on a single example, my class always
looks comparatively at several contemporary Islamic societies. In
so doing, students learn to tease out the variation in cultural
forms of Islamic law, particularly in multicultural contexts, where
Islamic law is positioned in relation to secular systems, such as in
Kenya and Tanzania, where I conduct my research. 2 With diverse
examples, I attempt to demonstrate how people live within
multiple normative orders that have different impact on their
lives. The amount of variation in Islamic societies frequently
surprises students. Additionally, they find that some examples
challenge the stereotypes they routinely held about gender and
Islamic law. Examples, such as women succeeding in lawsuits
against men and young women fighting for the right to wear the
veil in school, reveal the complexity of the law's role in
constructing identity and inequality. Students with feminist
commitments must struggle to clarify their positions in relation to
these examples.
Anthropology courses encourage students to reflect on their
own cultural circumstances with new perspectives through
encounters with seemingly "different" societies "Making the
familiar strange" is a standard anthropological teaching gambit
that uses intense engagement with a range of contextualized
examples to encourage the student to see his or her own cultural
context perhaps from a new, more skeptical, and more analytical
perspective. Certainly, the Islamic example forces non-Muslim
students as well as American Muslim students to think anew
about the relationship between church and state, stereotyping,
and inequality. Students are sometimes relieved at what they see
as the moral underpinnings of the law in the United States, such
as the abstract notion of equality. Also, the American legal
system's approaches to personhood, race, and faith frequently
horrify students when they discover that they have never realized
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY (1984).

11. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS
IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).

12. See, e.g., SUSAN F. HIRSCH, PRONOUNCING AND PERSEVERING: GENDER
AND THE DISCOURSES OF DISPUTING IN AN AFRICAN ISLAMIC COURT (1998).
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such underpinnings in the legal doctrine of their own country.
It is especially valuable to allow students to explore questions
of justice and morality in relation to concrete situations. On the
Wesleyan campus, there is always a conflict brewing (or erupting)
that is ripe for consideration.
Not only are students more
motivated to discuss conflicts that have immediate connections to
themselves, but such discussions allow me, as the instructor, to
appreciate the struggles and commitments that are their
preoccupation, as inhabitants of our campus. All too often, we
expect our students to check their politics and their identities at
the classroom door. Since this is not really possible or even
desirable, it is important, in some classes, to engage them directly.
For example, several years ago my "Discourse and Legal
Processes" class abandoned discussion of readings on cases about
hate speech to talk about the status of a Wesleyan-sponsored
student residence called Malcolm X House. One of many interestbased residences on campus, Malcolm X House, has always been a
favorite dorm for African-American students. Controversy began
when a white student sought housing in Malcolm X and was
turned down. In the midst of discussions over this decision, our
university President sparked a campus-wide debate when he
stated that he intended to "integrate" Malcolm X house. Our class
discussion touched on many ethical dilemmas in the conflict:
separatism and integration (among other political strategies); free
expression and the potential silencing of views not deemed
politically correct by Wesleyan standards; state law and campus or
community autonomy; as well as housing discrimination and
creating safe space.
The discussion was heated. Although
students sometimes ignored my attempts to direct them towards
relevant concepts and readings from our course, it was gratifying
that some combination of what we studied and what they
experienced on campus helped them establish views of what was
right, fair, legal, and possible in relation to this conflict.
Explicitly merging the campus context with the classroom
context creates difficult and challenging interchanges.
For
example, during the discussion, one African-American student,
who had been quite vocal in arguing for "X House" to remain
exclusively African-American, refused to participate any longer.
According to him, most students in the class did not have the life
experiences--of, for example, racism, racial harassment, or topdown housing decrees-to understand the points he was making.
Both white students and students of color objected, reminding him
that the classroom itself was a place where people could learn
about such experiences and could begin to develop approaches to
conflict that would avoid or counteract further experiences of
racism and oppression. Although unconvinced, he nonetheless
rejoined the discussion, which continued to remain tense with
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guarded overtones.
As the class period ended, I asked students to think about our
classroom as a linguistic context. We spent the next class looking
back at our discourse for clues about the meanings behind what
had been said and how it was said. We talked about linguistic
strategies, such as controlling the conversation, claiming
authority, silencing, and refusing to speak. We discussed what
these strategies might have meant and what they did or did not
accomplish in the discussion. During this discussion someone
asked me why I, as the instructor, failed to make the classroom a
"safe space" where everyone felt free to speak. Another wondered
why I had not created a "comfort zone." But I responded that
instructors cannot guarantee safe space in or out of the classroom.
This point allowed for a productive reconsideration of Malcolm X
house as a safe space. Even though opening up the classroom in
this way can lead to volatile discussions, this approach has the
advantage of treating the students as whole persons with political
and ethical commitments. The ability of my students to debate
from their own standpoints starkly contrasts with Mertz's
description of the severely delimited subject positions of student
participants in the role-playing debates enacted in law school
classrooms:
Each time a professor places a student in this landscape, the
student must reorient herself and learn to focus on the details
needed to shape a legal argument, convert social referents into legal
categories, and discern the levels and types of authority. The
human characters in the conflict story become strategic skeletons,
defined by legally delimited contexts, shaped by their places in
ongoing dialogic arguments. While role-playing in the classroom
attempts to bring students to the level of actual people, the
particular roles played omit many of the social particulars that
shape not only social interactions, but also moral assessments of
those interactions. 'a
III. MAKING THE CULTURE OF THE CLASSROOM VISIBLE
I turn now to another major point in Mertz's paper: her
concern with who participates in law school classrooms. She
combines her findings with those of other studies to conclude that,
depending on the type of school and the instructor, white male
students speak more in law school classrooms, especially in
Socratic classrooms. 4 She argues that the silence of students of
color and white females can amount to another erasure of
differences in experience and background from the context of legal

13. Mertz, supra note 1, at 107 (citations omitted).
14. See id. at 110 (discussing the tendency for white male law students to
dominate classroom discussion).
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education. She is cautious about the implications of this second
form of "cultural invisibility;" however, she suggests that this
participation structure conveys a powerful message about the
central priorities of the law and about who is entitled to speak in
law's language. 5 On this point, Mertz addresses my friendly
critique of her use of the phrase "cultural invisibility," as offered in
the oral presentation of these comments. When I consider the
classroom Mertz depicts, I do not think that culture-in the sense
of cultural background that differs from mainstream white
American culture-is invisible at all. For me, a particular cultural
form that Mertz refers to as "dominant culture" is highly visible.
Reflecting the priorities of the law, aspects of this cultural regime
occupy virtually all of the space in the classroom. The white men
comfortably control and manipulate classroom language in a
decontextualized form, which tends towards disconnection from
moral entailments. This is the culture of the law, and white men
are its prime producers. Those who do not fit the categories are
not, however, invisible; they are particularly visible at the fringes
of the dominant culture. However, it is this dominant culture that
takes up the majority of the classroom. Moreover, we cannot make
assumptions about what cultural perspectives marginalized
individuals might add by speaking. I am led to ask: When law
students other than white men speak, will they offer anything
different from the mainstream response?
This question is
particularly relevant for the Socratic classroom.
The
"democratization" of a classroom that relies on the Socratic method
is unlikely to produce liberating or counter-hegemonic messages.
My point is not that students should sit in silence, especially
women and students from underrepresented minority groups.
However, to develop pedagogical reform that addresses their lack
of participation requires knowing why particular students tend not
to speak. The vast social science literature on participation in
other classrooms offers a number of explanations that may or may
not apply. Students might tend to orient themselves with one
another through their silence, staking out identities as classmates.
They might feel deeply alienated, as some indeed report in Mertz's
work. We might romanticize their silence as either conscious or
unconscious resistance. Without knowing more about what they
are experiencing, it is not clear whether any of these explanations
is relevant. I have had students sit mute through four years of
college classes and emerge with both a solid education and a
radical critique of the silencing tendencies of elite institutions. So
I never assume that students are not understanding fully-indeed,
often they are really "getting it" when they sit silently. As
Gramsci argued, alienation may be the first step in leading people

15. Id.
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to become conscious of the contradictions that underlie their
situation.' 6 Experiencing alienation might teach a student where
to place himself or herself in relation to mainstream law as
students and as practitioners. At the same time, he or she might
develop a critique of legal education that, depending on career
choice, contributes to significant change.
I am very curious about what these students are saying in the
hallways, their clinical classes, their work experiences, their study
groups, and their casual conversations. Is it the case that they are
sorting out their moral and ethical stances on legal issues in these
settings? If so, Mertz suggests that more support, validation, and
guidance of these aspects of their law school experience appear
warranted. But, as Mertz also says, there are no quick fixes. It is
not for me to say; however, it seems that what is most troubling
about the Socratic classroom may not be fixable. Given the deep
resonance between the linguistic behavior inculcated in the
Socratic classroom and the basic tenets of American law and
society, this approach will likely hang on tenaciously.
CONCLUSION

There is another conversation I routinely have with students,
especially in their senior year when some come to me for advice
about applying to law school. I talk to them honestly and openly
about the real differences between an undergraduate education in
anthropology and the experience of law school. I tell them that
most law professors will not indulge their attempts to resolve their
own problems, identities, and anxieties in class or even out of
class. Moreover, law professors will not provide a "safe space" for
addressing political and personal crises that emerge in their law
school experience. So I encourage them to be ready to use their
anthropological skills to analyze the law school they choose to
attend as an ethnographic context with its own culture, rituals,
discourses, norms, and power relations. By taking the same
perspective on their law school classrooms, they can sort out, for
example, when abstraction is necessary and when other discourses
are welcome. Through such analyses, they can also find places in
which to act on their ethical, moral, and political commitments,
and they can learn how to put the law school classroom in its place
within the larger context of the communities in which they live.
Despite difficulties in translating between my own discipline
16. See JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, OF REVELATION AND
REVOLUTION: CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM, AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH

AFRICA 21-30 (1991) (discussing the approaches to culture, hegemony,
ideology, and consciousness taken by thinkers like Antonio Gramsci). See
generally ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF
ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans.,
International Publishers 1971).
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and the law, I will continue to believe that anthropology provides
completely appropriate undergraduate training for those entering
law school. Moreover, I am thrilled that I can help prepare
students by assigning Mertz's paper the next time I teach "Legal
Anthropology" or "Discourse and Legal Processes" to Wesleyan
undergraduates. My students will greatly benefit, as we all have
benefited from Mertz's writing. Mertz's scholarship will be a
foundation for an ethnographic understanding of law school for
those who will go on to enter that context. By contextualizing and
closely analyzing this and other law school experiences, students
may find productive and imaginative ways of engaging those
issues effaced by the Socratic method. Such a goal seems to be
encompassed in what Mertz intends when she writes:
[Bly integrating the perspectives offered by anthropology, the U.S.
legal language, the legal system it encodes, and the educational
institutions, which teach it, may respond to some of the most
pressing challenges facing legal education today. 17
Her article is an important step in that response.

17. Mertz, supra note 1, at 92.

